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Constructing Zoroastrian Identity 
in Muslim Iran
In the article I would like to pay attention to the internal diversity of so-called Muslim 
world. In my research I deal with the Zoroastrian religious minority in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Although contemporary Iran is a confessional state and its offi  cial religion is Twel-
ver Shi’ism, the religious pluralism is present in the country. I would like to comment on the 
process of constructing Zoroastrian collective identity in the context of Islamic state. 
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Zoroastrians in Iran
Zoroastrianism is an ancient Iranian religion founded by Zoroaster, the inspirer of the 
reforms applied to ancient Iranian beliefs. One of the major unsolved problems in the 
history of Zoroastrianism is the location of the prophet in space and time:
“While there is general agreement that he did not live in western Iran, attempts to 
locate him in specifi c regions of eastern Iran, including Central Asia, remain tenta-
tive. Also uncertain are his dates. Plausible arguments place him anywhere from the 
ͷ͹th century BCE to just before the rise of the Achaemenid empire under Cyrus II the 
Great in the mid-ͼth century BCE, with the majority of scholars seeming to favor da-
tes around ͷͶͶͶ BCE (Malandra ͸ͶͶͻ).”
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education, of whom “hardly one or two in a hundred have any position”, and of whom 
the villagers in particular were “helpless in the aff airs of life” (Boyce ͷͿͼͿ).”
Beside eff orts to abolish jizya, Manekji inspired repairing and erection of Zoroastrian 
buildings in Yazd, Kerman and Tehran and establishing of schools for mainly illiterate 
Zoroastrians. As Boyce claims, the time after the abolition of jizya was “in many ways a 
golden age for the Irani Zoroastrians” (͸ͶͶͷ: ͸ͷͷ). The changes brought progress in the 
fi eld of education and improvement of their economic situation. Since the events the si-
tuation of Zoroastrian community in Iran has been developing, but the turning point in 
the modern history of Zoroastrians in Iran was the Constitutional Revolution of ͷͿͶͼ–ͶͿ 
that led to the establishment of the fi rst Iranian Parliament.
The constitutional movement tended to stop discrimination and to gua-
rantee equal treatment for all citizens. In the new constitution drafted in ͷͿͶͼ/ͷͿͶͽ 
Islam was the offi  cial religion of the country but recognized religious minorities gai-
ned civil rights equivalent to the rights of Muslims and were given representatives in 
Parliament͸. The autonomy over their international aff airs was increased (Kestenberg 
Amighi ͷͿͿͶ: ͷͼͶ–ͷͼͷ). They gained greater economic freedom and new opportuni-
ties for growth. At that time the modern Zoroastrian community concentrated mostly 
in the capital city begun to establish. As Kestenberg Amighi remarks, “the revolution 
thus created the atmosphere for substantial change in the Zoroastrian community; it 
disrupted Zoroastrians old community institutions and opened the way for develop-
ment in new directions” (ͷͿͿͶ: ͷͼͺ). 
Another key event in the modern history of the Zoroastrian community in 
Iran was the Islamic Revolution that has completely changed the sociopolitical situation 
of religious minorities. The revolution overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty (ͷͿ͸ͻ–ͷͿͽͿ) and 
transformed a constitutional monarchy into an Islamic republic where religion is used as 
a political ideology. The new character of the state created “a new set of relationships 
between the state and the religious minorities, constituting compartmentalization and 
segmentation” (Sanasarian ͸ͶͶͼ: ͽ͹). Although in theory the recognized minorities kept 
the similar status as before ͷͿͽͿ, in reality their situation become more complex. The 
sharp distinction between us-Muslims and them-non-Muslims, based on the state ideo-
logy, has developed (Sanasarian ͸ͶͶͼ: ͽ͹). 
According to the Iranian constitution proclaimed after the Islamic Revolution, 
Twelver Shi’ism is the offi  cial religion of the state but the four schools of law of Sunnite Is-
lam and Zaydi Shi’ism are also recognized. The new constitution was “not a republican con-
stitution made consistent with Shi’ism but a constitution purporting to be fundamentally 
͸)  The fi rst Zoroastrian representative in Parliament was Jamshid Jamshidiyān (ͷ;ͻͷ–
ͷͿ͹͸), a merchant and a prominent fi gure in the community.
In the course of time Zoroastrianism spread among Iranians and became the 
dominant religion in the country for centuries. It was the offi  cial religion of the Sassanid 
empire (͸͸ͺ–ͼͻͷ), the last Iranian state before the Arabic conquest. The triumph of Is-
lam in the Middle East brought the religious, sociopolitical and economic changes and 
became a turning point in the history of Zoroastrianism:
“between the seventh and thirteen centuries, Iranian culture underwent a series of po-
litical, religious, and social changes that displaced Zoroastrians from the apex of soci-
ety and elevated Muslims in their place. Certain events and actions helped Muslims – of 
Arab, Iranian, or mixed descent – rise to rank of elites while simultaneously working aga-
inst Zoroastrians who then became subalterns through colonization, assimilation, and 
alienation (Choksy ͷͿͿͽ: ͷͶ–ͷͷ).”
After the Arabic conquest, Zoroastrian population was marginalized and its members 
were treated as a group of an inferior social status. Many of them was exterminated or 
forced to conversion and many others left their homeland, mostly for India, where they 
live today known as the Parsis. As Khanbaghi reports, after the spread of Islam, the situ-
ation of Zoroastrians became worse than of other religious minorities and
“the major handicap of Zoroastrians under the Arab dynasties was their link to Iranian 
national identity. They had dominated Iran numerically and politically for more than a 
thousand of years. The Muslim Arabs who had had to fi ght them for the domination of 
the Iranian Plateau, considered them dangerous rivals. In the early days of their rule, 
the Arabs accepted Zoroastrian administrators and viziers of Zoroastrian background 
in their government, but after the uprisings in Iran, the only non-Muslims they relied 
in belonged to the Jewish or Christian faith (͸ͶͶͼ: ͹͹).”
As dhimmis, protected people according to Islamic categorization, Zoroastrians in Iran had 
to pay tax called jizya. The oppressive tax was abolished in the second half of the ninete-
enth century thanks to help brought by their fellow believers from Bombay. In  Bombay 
the Society for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Zoroastrians in Persia was es-
tablished  and the Parsis sent their agent, the merchant Manekji Limji Hatariaͷ, to Iran:
“Manekji set himself promptly and tirelessly to improve the lot of the small Zoroastrian 
community, shrunk in numbers, as he sadly records, so as to be no more than a pebble 
in the great heap of Muslim wheat; a people in the main of scanty means and little or no 
ͷ)  Manekji (ͷ;ͷ͹–ͷ;ͿͶ), born near Surat, was a son of Limji Hushang Hataria of Hindu-
stan. He reached the Persian Gulf in April ͷ;ͻͺ (Boyce ͷͿͼͿ).
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Constructing the collective identity through codes takes place mostly in socializing and 
communicative situations: “in diff erent rituals and ceremonies, and through various agen-
cies of socialization and educational institutions, ‘mass media,’ religious preachings and 
the like” (Eisenstadt ͸ͶͶͿ: ͷͺͶ). In these situations members of a group are introduced 
into the collectivity and collective rituals portraying its distinctive identity and cultural 
program of the collectivity. They are attached to its symbols and boundaries. The spread 
of the ideas is closely related to patterns of cultural creativity such as art, philosophy, li-
terature, architecture and ‘popular culture’ in the great variety of manifestations. The 
process of collective identity construction is infl uenced by various social actors, espe-
cially by elites and social leaders in interaction with the rest of a group. The core of this 
interaction is the activation of predispositions or propensities by diff erent ‘infl uentials’ 
attempting to attain hegemony in various settings. When their ideas of boundaries and 
symbols fi nd are acknowledged by wider sectors of the community, the collective iden-
tities may crystallize (Eisenstadt ͸ͶͶͿ: ͷͺͶ–ͷͺ͸).
Eisenstadt and Giesen recognize three major codes of the construction of col-
lective identity. They are seen as ideal types because in reality the coding usually involves 
elements of diff erent codes. These are codes of primordiality, civility and sacredness (or 
culture). The primordial code promotes distinction based at the “nature” and uses original 
categories perceived as objective and unchangeable as gender, kinship, ethnicity, race. In 
the civic code the collectivity is based on familiarity of social routines, traditions and rules 
of participation in everyday life. According to the sacred code, the identity is based on the 
particular relation of its subject to the sacred that may be understood as God, Reason, Rati-
onality (ͷͿͿͷ: ͽͼ–;͸). Referring to the above mentioned theory I would like to present a few 
ideas used in constructing Iranian Zoroastrian collective identity by the group leaders.
Constructing Zoroastrian Collective Identity
In contemporary Iran Zoroastrians reside mostly in urbanized areas of Tehran, Yazd and Ker-
man provinces. Today, the majority of Zoroastrians live in Tehran where their community de-
veloped during the last century. In the ͷ;ͻͶ’s there were about ͻͶ Zoroastrian merchants in 
the capital of Iran and by the turn of twentieth century the community consisted of less than 
͹͹Ͷ members, fi rst of all gardeners working on the land of the Shah and merchants. Accor-
ding to the population census of ͷͿͷ͸, ͻͶͶ Zoroastrians were found in the city at that time 
and in the course of time more and more Zoroastrians were migrating to Tehran seeking eco-
nomic and other opportunities off ered by the capital city (Kestenberg Amighi ͷͿͿͶ: ͷͺ͹–
ͷͺ;). After the Constitutional Revolution the Zoroastrian community in Tehran developed 
and new institutions appeared. Among them were Tehran Zoroastrian Council (Anjoman-e 
Zartoshtiyān-e Tehrān) established in ͷͿͶͽ, Tehran Mobeds Council (Anjoman-e Mobedān-e 
Tehrān or Konkāsh-e Mobedān-e Tehrān) established in ͷͿͻͷ, Zoroastrian Women’s Council 
(Sāzmān-e Zanān-e Zartoshti) established in ͷͿͻͶ and others (Mazdāpur ͷͿͿͻ: Ϳͺ–Ϳͽ). Also 
in the fi eld of education a major step forward has been made:
Islamic and to incorporate specifi cally Shi’ite priciples of government” (Arjomand ͷͿͿ͸). 
According to Article ͷ͹ of the constitution, “Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians 
are the only recognized religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to 
perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in 
matters of personal aff airs͹ and religious education” (Iran – Constitution ͷͿͿͺ)ͺ. 
The above mentioned status of recognized religious minorities is based on the 
Islamic category of protected people (dhimmi). However, it does not reveal these communi-
ties from marginalization or even discrimination in the country where confession is one of the 
most important determinant of social status. Islam is closely related to every sphere of the 
public life which is saturated with religious elements. It causes that the reality is much more 
complicated for the citizens who confess other religions. The marginalization of non-Muslim 
communities in Iran after ͷͿͽͿ and the stress put on the religion in public life has caused that 
religion plays more important role than before the revolution also for religious minorities.
Collective Identity Theory 
The conceptual model used in this article is based on the collective identity theory develo-
ped by Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen (ͷͿͿͷ). For the purpose of my analysis I 
state that collective identity is not naturally generated but socially constructed. More precisely 
speaking, it is produced by the social construction of boundaries which divide and separate 
us from other groups. The process of constructing boundaries is based on symbolic codes of 
distinction that led us to recognition of diff erences in the chaos of the outside world:
“Codes can be compared to maps that provide the actor on a journey with instructi-
ons about what to expect. Much as maps could never reproduce the diversity of an 
actual landscape, but always abstract landscape after a particular fashion, so too do 
codes always off er only an arbitrary simplifi cation of situation. And much like maps, 
codes can be more or less precise, can correlate more or less accurately to reality. But 
just as we cannot make a purposeful motion without having an elementary map in 
mind, social reality cannot be perceived without codes. Codes of social classifi cation 
are the core element in the construction of communality and otherness, of collective 
identity and diff erentiation. No boundary would have substance without codes (Gie-
sen ͷͿͿ;: ͷ͹).” 
͹)  The Zoroastrian code of personal aff airs regulates following matters: marriage propo-
sal (khāstegāri); engagement (nāmzadi); marriage (zanāshu’i) and matters concerning 
it; divorce (talāq); children guardianship (negahdāri-ye farzandān) and other matters 
concerning off spring; will (vasiyat) (Qavānin-o-moqarrarāt-e omumi ͸ͶͶͽ).
ͺ)  Article ͷ͹ recognizes Iranian Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians as “the only religious 
minorities”, thus excludes Baha’is from social life.
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is no way to make converts. Many aspects of religious life are subject to control of govern-
ment institutions. Everything what is said, written or put on the website may be checked 
by the Islamic authorities. 
The leaders of the Zoroastrian community are both priests, mobeds, and secular 
intellectuals, some of them connected with Zoroastrian public institutions. The most popu-
lar offi  cial institutions involved in process of spreading and institutionalization of the idea of 
Zoroastrian identity based on commonly shared symbols are anjomans, councils located in 
the places inhabited by Zoroastrians. The media the community leaders use for spreading 
their ideas of collective identity are restricted by the boundaries of Iranian law. As Iranian 
constitution states, “publications and the press have freedom of expression except when 
it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public” (Article 
͸ͺ, Iran – Constitution ͷͿͿͺ). Also freedom of expression in radio and television is restricted 
and what they broadcast must be compatible with “the Islamic’ criteria and the best inte-
rests of the country” (Article ͷͽͻ, Iran – Constitution ͷͿͿͺ). The regulation also concerns 
the Internet which is under one of the most restrictive censorships in the worldͽ.
Sharing the status of a religious minority recognized by the constitution (aqal-
liyat-e dini), Zoroastrians use religious elements and values in constructing their colle-
ctive identity. As I mentioned before, it seems that under the religious pressure that ap-
peared in Iran after the Islamic Revolution distinct religion of non-Muslims plays more 
important role in their social life than before ͷͿͽͿ. Also during my fi eld research in ͸ͶͶ; 
I noticed that contemporary Zoroastrians perceived themselves as more interested in 
their own religion as they used to be before the revolution. 
It may be interpreted in terms of Castell’s identity for resistance which is an instru-
ment used by minority group to build its identity in the context of social marginalization: 
“It constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, 
usually on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defi ned by history, geo-
graphy, or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance. For in-
stance, ethnically based nationalism, as Scheff  proposes, often “arises out of a sense of 
alienation, on the one hand, and resentment against unfair exclusion, whether political, 
economic or social.” Religious fundamentalism, territorial communities, nationalist self 
affi  rmation, or even the pride of self-denigration, inverting the terms of oppressive dis-
course (…), are all expressions of what I name the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded. 
That is, the building of defensive identity in the terms of dominant institutions/ideologies, 
reversing the value judgment while reinforcing the boundary (Castells ͸ͶͶͺ: Ϳ).” 
ͽ)  Considering violators of freedom of expression in the virtual space Iran has a leading 
place on the list of the “Enemies of the Internet ͸ͶͷͶ” drawn up by Reporters Without 
Borders (Morillon ͸ͶͷͶ).
.
“In this period, Zoroastrian community institutions grew rapidly, stimulated by new inte-
rests and needs of the population and the availability of fi nancial resources (…). In ͷͿ͹͹ 
a Parsi philantrophist, Bahramji Bivakji, gave funds for a boys’ school, Firuz Bahram. 
A girls’ high school, Anushirvan Dagar, was built shortly afterwards in ͷͿ͹ͼ with funds 
collected by the Parsi representative, Ardeshirji. These schools were of the highest qua-
lity in Iran. The girls’ grammar school, Iraj, was the fi rst Iranian school to have French and 
English classes and to include sports in its curriculum. The best teachers were recruited 
from foreign schools and the use of male teachers in girls’ schools was accepted in order 
to acquire the most qualifi ed staff  (Kestenberg Amighi ͷͿͿͶ: ͷͽ–ͷͽͻ).”
In ͷͿͻͼ there were almost ͻ,ͶͶͶ of Zoroastrian residents in Tehran and their number grew 
to approximately ͷ͸,ͻͶͶ by ͷͿͽͺ. There were diff erent organizations, clubs, schools and 
other institutions as clinic, library and publishing houses in the capital city before the Is-
lamic Revolution (Kestenberg Amighi ͷͿͿͶ: ͸ͷ͹). During the Pahlavi regime as other re-
ligious minorities Zoroastrians suff ered from discrimination, especially at the provincial 
level, and their institutions were subject to restrictions. On the other hand, they became 
an important symbol of ancient Persia and an instrument of Reza Shah’s nationalist ide-
ology. Their relations with the government were especially good during the regime of 
his son Mohammad Reza Shah (Sanasarian ͸ͶͶͼ: ͺͿ)ͻ. 
After the Islamic Revolution the number of Zoroastrians in Tehran in ͷͿ;Ͷ’s was 
estimated at about ͷͻ,ͶͶͶ (Sanasarian ͸ͶͶͼ: ͻͶ). Today, their population in the whole coun-
try equals ͸͸,ͻͶͶ-͸͹,ͶͶͶ (Niknām ͸ͶͶͽ: ͹ͻ)ͼ. As I mentioned before, after the triumph of 
the Islamic Revolution sharper distinction between us-Muslims and them-non-Muslims de-
veloped in social life of Iran. This process has infl uenced the existence of marginalized reli-
gious minorities, their ways of life and their perception of own cultural heritage. The intel-
lectual leaders of such groups as religious authorities, teachers or journalists make eff orts 
to preserve their religion and tradition. Through ceremonies and rituals, diff erent agen-
cies of socialization and education, through art, religious preaching, newspapers and pub-
lications, the collective identity is being constructed and members of the community are 
attached to its symbols and boundaries. However, in the sociopolitical context of Islamic 
country it is diffi  cult to compromise between restrictions and protection of non-Muslim 
culture. Promotion of the minority religions outside the community is forbidden and there 
ͻ)  On the Tehran Zoroastrian community during the Pahlavi era see for example Kesten-
berg Amighi (ͷͿͿͶ). 
ͼ)  It is worth to mention that the number of Zoroastrians worldwide in ͷͿͿͶ’s was esti-
mated at about ͷͻͶ,ͶͶͶ but the community is not homogeneous and distinctive cultural 
patterns characterize Iranian Zoroastrians and Parsis living in separate geo-cultural are-
as for ages (Writer ͷͿͿͺ). 
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cient times Iran will become again the center of science and knowledge and the source of 
craft and culture (Shahzādi ͸ͶͶͷ: ͸Ͷ͸)Ϳ.”
According to this idea, Iranian culture can be maintained through union of all Iranians as it hap-
pened in the history, for example during the invasions of Alexander the Great, Arabs or Mon-
gols. The basis is common past and heritage. The main value emphasized is Iranian nationa-
lism and national identity that have been keeping the nation together during the history:
“Maybe today, from the place we have come across we need to look again into the past. 
The past when diff erent tribes and states tried hard to destroy religion and culture of 
Iran. (…) Praise those who (…) still swagger preserving these rites, language and al-
phabet; protect and enrich this culture (Shahryāri ͸ͶͶ;).” 
The civil (or traditional) code of collective identity construction is based at stressing the 
common tradition and historical continuity:
“the celebration of traditions and commemoration or past events becomes the core 
issue for rituals. At special places and on special dates, the tradition of the commu-
nity is constructed and reconstructed by elaborated rituals, by public celebrations 
as well as by private parties. Commemorative rituals represent the past of the Com-
munity, founding myths recall the beginning of its history, special commensural ri-
tuals unite the members, and special classicist forms show its continuity on the le-
vel of aesthetics (Giesen ͷͿͿ;: ͹ͷ).”
The identity concept popularized by many Zoroastrian leaders is build on symbols of Ira-
nian history. Great fi gures of Iranian past as kings of the Achaemenid dynasty (ͻͻͶ–͹͹Ͷ) as 
Cyrus the Great, Darius the Great or Ardashir I, the founder of the Sassanid dynasty (͸͸ͺ–
ͼͻͷ), are recalled. One of the most popular symbolic places is Persepolis, the ceremonial ca-
pital of the Achaemenid empire located in the Fars province. Also much attention is paid to 
FerdowsiͷͶ and his opus magnum The Epic of Kings (Shāhnāme). It is very popular and infl u-
ential Persian national epic reviving and regenerating the Persian language and cultural tra-
ditions, gathering ancient Persian myths and legends. The Shāhnāme’s heroes decorate Zo-
roastrian calendars and postcards. Zoroastrian institutions as Jamshid Cultural Foundation 
(Bonyād-e Farhangi-ye Jamshid) in Tehran organize free lessons of Shāhnāme-khāni, reading 
of Ferdowsi’s epic. Ferdowsi’s birthday is also celebrated. The old Iranian ceremonies as sea-
Ϳ)  Although this speech by mobed Shahzādi was originally written in ͷͿͺ͸, it is still print-
ed and read in Iran.
ͷͶ)  Abu’l-Qāsem Ferdowsi (ͿͺͶ–ͷͶͷͿ or ͷͶ͸ͻ) – one of the greatest Persian epic poets.
The eff orts to underline Zoroastrian religious distinctiveness may be characterized in 
terms of the code of sacredness. Among the elements used in the process of identity 
construction are three Zoroastrian essentials: good thoughts, good words and good de-
eds (pendār-e nik, goftār-e nik, kerdār-e nik) that should be observed by worshippers. It is 
a universal principle not controversial in the eyes of Islam. The most common iconogra-
phic representations are pictures of the prophet Zoroaster and the symbol of fravahar. 
Next to the emblems indispensable in Iranian public institutions as pictures of the Sup-
reme Leaders, Ruhollāh Khomeini and Ali Khāmenei, Zoroastrians put pictures of their 
prophet. It can be found in schools for the minority, temples, clubs, organizations. Also 
the fravahar, which is widely recognized iconographic symbol of Zoroastrianism, is a very 
common emblem marking Zoroastrian public sphere. It is also drawn on many elements 
of everyday life as calendars, textbooks, signboards. 
As religious references are obvious for the community offi  cially recognized 
by dominant group as a religious minority, much more interesting seems to be construc-
ting collective Zoroastrian identity through the code of civility. The ideas are inspired by 
ancient Persian history and mythology. It is the part of Zoroastrian symbolical culture 
common both for Iranian Zoroastrians and Iranian Muslims. The idea stresses their joint 
heir and the origin of being Iranian regardless of religion. 
After the Islamic Revolution the unique link of Zoroastrians to Iranian cul-
ture was offi  cially stressed by one of the community leaders, priest Rostam Shahzādi, 
deputy representing the minority in the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregān) de-
liberating on a project of new Iranian constitution. In his fi rst speech during the discus-
sion over the article of the document considering the status of religious minorities he 
explained that many Zoroastrians would not like to be considered as minority because 
of their particular connection with Iranian land and people. He emphasized that Zoroas-
trians and Iranian Muslims are the same people sharing the same traditions, although 
after conversion of most Iranians to Islam the name of their God and the prophet had 
changed (Sanasarian ͸ͶͶͼ: ͼͽ).
Zoroastrians perceive themselves as inheritors of Iranian tradition. As Mazdāpur 
writes, “at present the little Zoroastrian community is a relic of ancestors’ old rites of this 
land“ (ͷͿͿͻ: ͷͷͻ). Instead of emphasizing diff erences between Iranians of distinct religions, 
Zoroastrian leaders try to put stress on unity of all Iranians. They stress strengthening of cul-
tural ties between Iranian citizens instead of promotion of religious believes:
“This is a praiseworthy way, good intention and philanthropy inherited from our honorable 
ancestors Darius, Cambyses and Ardashir;. We are confi dent that if all Iranians also follow 
this way and respect and consider important their own splendid historical past, as in an-
;)  Famous Persian kings of the Achaemenid and the Sassanid empires.
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historical memories and commemoration of past events. At fi rst the new ideas of nation
 and nationalism appeared sporadically but fl ourished in the course of Constitutional Re-
volution and later “were transformed into a state-sponsored form of ethno-nationalism 
during the Pahlavi period (ͷͿ͸ͻ–ͽ;)” (Ashraf ͸ͶͶͺb: ͻ͸͹):
“Celebration and commemoration of the collective historical memory through sym-
bols and myths, rituals and ceremonies, museums and archeological sites, Achaeme-
nid architectural design for public edifi ces, nationalistic music, and a national dress 
code became its hallmarks. In this period, the emerging nationalist historical writings 
shifted from the emphasis on the continuity with “the traditional history” to the con-
tinuity with “factual history” by emphasizing the Achaemenid period as the political 
origin of the state (Ashraf ͸ͶͶͺb: ͻ͸ͼ).”
The main stress was put on such ideas as the continuity of ͸ͻ centuries of history of Per-
sian empire and Iranian nation formed during the Achaemenid period. In the ideological 
framework of the Pahlavi state the idea of Achaemenid Iran as a geo-political concept, 
as “the empire of the Aryans”, was adopted:
“These ideas laid the foundation of what Alessandro Bausani (…) calls “Aryan and Neo-
Achaemenid nationalism.” They led to four historical innovations: the change, in Wes-
tern languages, of the country’s name from Persia to Iran in ͷͿ͹ͻ, signifying the pri-
mordial Aryan origin of the nation; the assumption of the title Āryā-mehr (the Sun of 
the Aryans) by Moḥammad Reżā Shah in ͷͿͼͻ; celebration of the ͸,ͻͶͶ years of Per-
sian empire in ͷͿͽͷ; and fi nally, the change of the national calendar from the Islamic 
Hejri to the invented Šāhanšāhi – the time of the formation of the Persian empire by 
Cyrus the Great (…). The historical agenda included an emphasis on the Achaemenid 
era (as discussed above) and the encouragement of archeological excavations by Ame-
rican and European archeologists. The foundation of an archeological museum in Te-
hran (Muza-ye Irān-e bāstān), construction of public edifi ces with Achaemenid mo-
tifs (…), and the foundation of the National Monuments Council of Iran (…) were part 
of these eff orts (Ashraf ͸ͶͶͼb: ͻ͸ͽ).”
Beside the ancient history, Persian language was also the main element of the Pahlavi 
ideology of building homogeneous Iranian national identity and of the new state nati-
onalism. The language policy tending to purge Persian from Arabic appeared in ninete-
enth century postulated by a group of nationalist intellectuals. In the course of time the 
idea emerged and in ͷͿ͹ͻ the Iranian Academy of Language (Farhangestān-e Zabān-e 
Irān) aiming at replacing Arabic words with their Persian equivalents was established 
(Ashraf ͸ͶͶͼb: ͻ͸ͽ).
sonal festivals of Nowruz, Mehrgān, Tiregān and Sade are popularized. Zoroastrian magazi-
nes pay much attention to Persian history, literature and language common for all Iranians. 
Also interest is put in Persian language freed from Arabic elements. For exam-
ple some of journalists of Zoroastrian cultural biweekly magazine “Amordād” in their ar-
ticles try to use as many originally Persian words as possible. The magazine also regularly 
publishes Persian equivalents of words of Arabic origin encouraging readers to use them, 
for example nām instead of esm (name), andak andak in place tadrijan (gradually).
This above described ideas have a long history in Iranian culture. The perception 
of Iranian nation (ariya) as one entity united by religious, cultural and ethnic elements goes 
back as far as the times of Achaemenid reign. As a political idea it has been documented as 
a feature of Sassanian propaganda in the third century. The idea of Iranian kingdom or em-
pire (Irānshahr) that marked later Iranian history has developed (Gnoli ͸ͶͶͺ: ͻͶͺ–ͻͶͻ):
“In Iran the claim to Achaemenid origins, the identifi cation of the Sasanian dynasty 
with the dynasty of the Kayaniansͷͷ, the setting up of a traditional heritage that met 
the requirements of the new dynasty and the social forces that were its mainstay are 
just so many aspects of a single political and cultural process that was vigorously upheld 
by the Sasanian propaganda. (…) In Sasanian Iran there began to take shape a national 
culture, fully aware of being “Iranian”, that was motivated by the restoration and the 
revival of the wisdom of the “sages of old,” dānāgān pēšēnīgān, as well as by the glori-
fi cation of a great heroic past, and was imbued with an omnipresent antiquarian taste 
and an archaizing spirit. This process developed steadily in the course of time and took 
on a defi nite shape especially in the ͼth century, but its roots were nonetheless in the 
͹rd century, in the transition of power from the Arsacids (q.v.) to the Sasanians and in 
the Zoroastrian church’s gaining of political recognition (Gnoli ͸ͶͶͺ: ͻͶͻ–ͻͶͼ).”
As opposed to countries such as Syria and Egypt that lost their languages as a result of Ara-
bic hegemony, Iran maintained its linguistic and cultural distinctiveness. Revival of Persian 
culture in the frames of Islamic reality began in the early Abbasid Caliphate (ͽͻͶ–ͷ͸ͻ;)  and 
has been developing in the course of time giving the foundation of modern Iranian iden-
tity. The stress was put on territorial ties and connections of people to the kingdom of Iran 
(irānshahr, irānzamin, molk-e Irān, mamlekat-e Irān, keshvar-e Irān). The idea was rooted in 
mythological and traditional history and supported for example by such activities as Nowruz 
festival, naqqāli – professional storytelling and Shāhnāme-khāni (Ashraf ͸ͶͶͺa).
In the nineteenth century the modern age of nation-building and nationalism 
in Iran has begun. It was rooted in the above mentioned historical awareness and cultu-
ral consciousness. Creation of new Iranian national identity was based on territorial ties, 
ͷͷ)  The Kayanid dynasty – a semi-mythological, ancient Iranian dynasty.
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Summarizing this short analysis I have to repeat that reality in the Islamic Republic of Iran brou-
ght new challenges for non-Muslim citizens. They had to fi nd the place in the social structure 
of restrictive theocratic country where the religion of majority is privileged and the law of the 
state is compatible with some laws of Sharia. Other religions are accepted and keep offi  cial 
status of recognized religious minorities or are entirely excluded from social life. 
It has infl uenced the process of constructing the collective identity of the religi-
ous minority groups as Zoroastrians. The construction of contemporary Zoroastrian colle-
ctive identity is complex and based on elements of both the sacred and the traditional code 
of distinction characterized by Giesen and Eisenstadt. Zoroastrian intellectuals and autho-
rities try to build the idea of collective identity within the boundaries of Islamic law. On one 
hand they emphasis the distinctiveness community recalling religious symbols and beliefs. 
On the other hand they try to overcome the marginal status and to stress the ties they have 
with Iranian culture and to show they are rightful members of Iranian nation.
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